ABB Terra AC

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Summary

ABB is aware of vulnerabilities in the product versions listed as affected in the advisory. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could cause the pollution of heap memory which potentially takes remote control of the product and performs a write operation to the flash memory to alter the firmware behavior.

The following versions of ABB Terra AC are affected:

• Terra AC wallbox (UL40/80A) <=1.8.32, 1.8.33
• Terra AC wallbox (UL32A) <=1.8.2, 1.8.34
• Terra AC wallbox (MID/ CE) <=1.8.32, 1.8.34
• Terra AC wallbox (JP) <=1.8.2, 1.8.34

Background

• Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Commercial Facilities, Critical Manufacturing, Energy, Transportation Systems
• Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide
• Company Headquarters Location: Switzerland

Vulnerabilities

Acknowledgments

• Itai Shmueli of Saiflow reported this vulnerability to Schneider Electric.

Notice

The information in this document is subject to change without notice, and should not be construed as a commitment by ABB. ABB provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall ABB or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if ABB or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. This document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from ABB, and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose. All rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners.

Mitigating factors

To attack with this kind of message, hackers must hijack CSMS (OCPP backends) first and then can send messages, OR the way to OCPP backend is unsafe itself (http) which can cause any kind of attack behavior and known as a common knowledge. Refer to section “General security recommendations” for further advise on how to keep your system secure.

Workarounds

Make sure OCPP backend that chargers are connected is strictly secured to avoid any kind of at-tack especially the communication relevant components. Use https(TLS) as basic communication foundation between charger and OCPP backend instead of http.

Frequently asked questions

What causes the vulnerability? The vulnerability is caused by firmware which it didn’t limit the length of OCPP field in certain case. What is Terra AC wallbox? Terra AC wallbox is a Level 2 Electric Vehicle charger. What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could cause the affected system node to take control of the charger to response wrong messages, Denial-of-Service, compromised internal state, and possibly remote code execution. How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? An attacker could try to exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially crafted OCPP message to chargers via OCPP backend(CSMS), which could be done remotely. This would require that the attacker has access to the system network and hijack the API of sending message OR hijack the network data directly if the charger is connected with unsafe http mode. Recommended practices help mitigate such attacks, see section Mitigating Factors above. Could the vulnerability be exploited remotely? Yes, an attacker who has network access to an affected system node could exploit this vulnerability. Can functional safety be affected by an exploit of this vulnerability? The charger potentially is running with unpredictable mode, including Denial-of-Service, compromised internal state, and possibly remote code execution. What does the update do? The update removes the vulnerability by modifying the validation rules of receiving data from OCPP backend. When this security advisory was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? No, ABB received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure. When this security advisory was issued, had ABB received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? No, ABB had not received any information indicating that this vulnerability had been exploited when this security advisory was originally issued

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).

Recommended Practices

CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of these vulnerabilities.

Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.

Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.

When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.

CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B–Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

Advisory Conversion Disclaimer

This ICSA is a verbatim republication of ABB PSIRT 9AKK108471A8948 from a direct conversion of the vendor’s Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA’s website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided “as-is” for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact ABB PSIRT directly for any questions regarding this advisory.

Revision History

• Initial Release Date: 2025-10-20

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

• May 26, 2026
• CISA – Cybersecurity Advisories
• jawad_admin