ABB B&R Automation Runtime DoS Vulnerability in System Diagnostics Manager (SDM)

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Summary

An update is available that resolves a vulnerability identified by B&Rs internal security analysis in the product versions listed as affected in this advisory. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could cause the product to stop.

The following versions of ABB B&R Automation Runtime DoS Vulnerability in System Diagnostics Manager (SDM) are affected:

• Automation Runtime <6.3
• Automation Runtime <Q4.93

Background

• Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Chemical, Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Dams, Energy, Healthcare and Public Health, Information Technology, Water and Wastewater
• Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide
• Company Headquarters Location: Switzerland

Vulnerabilities

Acknowledgments

• ABB PSIRT reported this vulnerability to CISA.

Notice

The information in this document is subject to change without notice, and should not be construed as a commitment by B&R. B&R provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall B&R or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if B&R or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. This document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from B&R, and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose. All rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners.

Mitigating factors

Deactivate the vulnerable component The SDM is deactivated by default on Automation Runtime version >=6.0. For Automation Runtime versions <6.0, the SDM can be deactivated in the Automation Studio project. Please refer to Automation Help GUID 1d915d67-07f7-4034-a472-c204b5cabbfe for further guidance. Access to the System Diagnostic Manager (SDM) shall be restricted to trusted personnel through appropriate external security measures. If SDM is required solely for maintenance purposes, it should be enabled or access granted only for the minimum time necessary to perform the task. Limit accessibility B&R recommends in general to configure the HTTP protocol over TLS (HTTPS). Customers may restrict access to the webserver by configuring mutual TLS (mTLS) in the Automation Studio project (Option “Validate SSL communication partner”). Be aware that configuring mTLS would impact also other applications using the AR webserver (e.g. mapp View). Please refer to Automation Help GUID 01ced6c0-28ef-4aaa-bd05-2442b971859c to learn more about the TLS Configuration in Automation Studio. In addition, accessibility of the webserver can be limited to trusted IP addresses using the Automation Runtime host-based firewall. Please refer to Automation Help GUID 75b8994b-f97a-4e0f-8278-43c7a737e65f for details. Refer to section “General security recommendations” for further advise on how to keep your system secure.

Frequently asked questions

What causes the vulnerability? The vulnerabilities are caused by improper resource locking. What is System Diagnostics Manager (SDM)? System Diagnostics Manager (SDM) is a webpage available over the Automation Runtime Webserver, showing key diagnostic information of the running controller What is Automation Runtime (AR)? B&R Automation Runtime is a middleware system enabling customers to run applications on B&R target systems. What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? An attacker who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities could cause the affected system node to stop. How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? An attacker could try to exploit the vulnerability by creating a specially crafted message and sending the message to an affected system node. This would require that the attacker has access to the system network, by connecting to the network either directly or through a wrongly configured or penetrated firewall, or that he installs malicious software on a system node or otherwise infects the network with malicious software. Recommended practices help mitigate such attacks, see section Mitigating Factors above. Could the vulnerability be exploited remotely? Yes, an attacker who has network access to an affected system node could exploit this vulnerability. Recommended practices include that process control systems are physically protected, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed. When this security advisory was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? No, B&R discovered the vulnerabilities through its own security analysis. When this security advisory was issued, had B&R received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? No, B&R had not received any information indicating that this vulnerability had been exploited when this security advisory was originally issued.

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).

Recommended Practices

CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of these vulnerabilities.

Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.

Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.

When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.

CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B–Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.

Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.

Advisory Conversion Disclaimer

This ICSA is a verbatim republication of ABB PSIRT SA25P002 from a direct conversion of the vendor’s Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA’s website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided “as-is” for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact ABB PSIRT directly for any questions regarding this advisory.

Revision History

• Initial Release Date: 2025-10-07

Legal Notice and Terms of Use

• May 26, 2026
• CISA – Cybersecurity Advisories
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